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ABSTRACT 
 
Patent misuse, a once-valuable doctrine used to remove 
anticompetitive actions enabled by patent grants from the 
marketplace, has been relatively disfavored by the courts 
for some time. Recent licensing practices by certain major 
players within the high-technology marketplace, however, 
provide an excellent opportunity for the doctrine to be 
reinvigorated and applied. Apple, Inc., through its attempts 
to prevent competitors from “cloning” its products, has 
become an anticompetitive force that appears to have 
impermissibly leveraged its patent portfolio in order to 
extract contractual protections of non-patented subject 
matter through “anti-cloning” provisions, improperly 
broadening the scope of its patent grants. This Article 
argues that this improper broadening of the patent grant 
constrains competition in unpatented subject matter, harms 
competition, and should be considered by the courts to 
constitute per se patent misuse or, in the alternative, patent 
misuse under a rule of reason analysis. As a result, Apple’s 
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patents that are tainted by the anti-cloning provision’s 
misuse should be held to be unenforceable at least as long 
as agreements that contain the offending provision are still 
in force. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As perhaps the most notable conflict in the so-called 
“technology patent wars,”1 the “smartphone wars” continue to rage 
on. The battlefield is comprised of multiple smartphone 
manufacturers attempting to leverage various intellectual property 
protections and regimes against their competitors through litigation 
and trade complaints. Both the ultimate outcome of the smartphone 
wars and how the individual skirmishes play out in front of the 
court of public opinion will have lasting effects on the wider 
struggle over whether stronger or more restricted intellectual 
property regimes should be adopted to serve the economies of the 
present and future. 
The results of smartphone skirmishes can be evaluated for 
clues as to developing trends in patent litigation, licensing, and 
settlements. This Article will examine a settlement license clause 
that has troubling implications for innovation not only in 
smartphones but also in software and industrial design in general: 
“anti-cloning provisions.” These provisions prohibit patent 
licensees from practicing licensed patents in ways that produce 
“clones” that are identical or substantially similar copies of 
products or functions. This work will argue that Apple’s decision 
to require Microsoft and HTC to acquiesce to anti-cloning 
provisions in the Apple/Microsoft and Apple/HTC settlement 
agreements sets a dangerous precedent for future patent licenses or 
settlement agreements and should be found to be per se illegal 
                                                                                                             
1 Richard Waters, Google Catches Up in Technology Patent Wars, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, at COMPANIES 18 (discussing the “smartphone 
industry’s patent wars” within the “intellectual property arms race”). 
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under the doctrine of patent misuse. As such, this Article will 
argue that that this pattern of misuse, especially given Apple’s 
demands for the inclusion of such a provision in any settlement 
with Samsung, should result in a finding of patent misuse in future 
litigation and provide an affirmative defense to any allegation of 
infringement. 
Part I will set out the background of the smartphone wars; 
discuss cross-licensing as a potential tool to bring about settlement; 
and conclude with an analysis of the anti-cloning provisions, their 
conceptual framework, and recent examples of these provisions in 
agreements to which the public has access. Part II will delve into 
an analysis of misuse, beginning with patent misuse, continuing 
with copyright misuse, later focusing on the restraints on the 
misuse doctrine and the differences between the two regimes’ 
doctrines, and concluding with a look at the intersection of 
antitrust and the misuse doctrine. Part III lays out the present 
work’s central argument: anti-cloning provisions should be per se 
illegal under the doctrine of patent misuse because they 
impermissibly extend the patent grant and are unacceptably 
anticompetitive. 
 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ANTI-CLONING WARS 
 
A.  A Brief Summary of the Smartphone Wars and their Casualties 
 
As one of the main battlefronts in the ongoing technology 
patent wars, the smartphone wars continually dominate mainstream 
media attention, particularly in technology-oriented reporting. 
They command attention as a result of not only the major players 
in the continual offensive, of which notable names include Google, 
Apple, Samsung, Sony, Microsoft, Nokia, Motorola, and HTC, but 
also the huge sums of money demanded and awarded. Indeed, 
some award amounts are larger than the nominal gross domestic 
product of small sovereign nations.2 
                                                                                                             
2 Compare Field Listing: GDP, World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015), with CHRIS BARRY ET AL., 
2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 8 (2013), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/ 
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Beginning in earnest in 2009 with Nokia’s infringement suit3 
and International Trade Commission (ITC) complaint4 against 
Apple, the smartphone wars have comprised of more than 50 suits; 
countersuits; and ITC complaints involving well over 200 patents, 
thousands of patent acquisitions between various parties, and 
massive settlement agreements and verdicts.5 Of course, every 
litigation carries potential risks for both sides: the patentee risks a 
finding of invalidity, instantly rendering a perceived asset 
worthless, while the alleged infringer risks a finding of 
infringement, becoming suddenly responsible for unanticipated 
damages and forced to the bargaining table in an extremely 
disadvantageous position. 
Because of this, it is not uncommon for patent litigants to 
attempt to find common ground in settlement agreements. An 
extensively utilized tool in high-tech patent settlements (and patent 
settlements in general) is cross-licensing, wherein the parties agree 
to trade intellectual property for intellectual property (among other 
covenants) and each party walks away from the table with 
additional freedom to operate and fewer litigation concerns. 
As such, many of these litigations have concluded with 
settlement agreements, notably the litigations involving 
Apple/Nokia (in favor of Nokia), Apple/HTC (in favor of Apple), 
and Nokia/HTC (in favor of Nokia).6 Virtually no public 
information regarding the Apple/Nokia or Nokia/HTC agreements 
is available (and will not be a focus of this work), but a redacted 
                                                                                                             
forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf (showing, 
specifically, that the top award listed in Chart 2c is larger than the GDP of 33 
sovereign nations according to the CIA World Factbook ranking). 
3 Nokia Sues Apple over iPhone’s Use of Patented Wireless Standards, 
APPLEINSIDER (Oct. 22, 2009, 11:20 AM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/ 
09/10/22/nokia_sues_apple_over_iphones_use_of_patented_wireless_standards.
html. 
4 Chris Foresman, Nokia Hurls New Salvo in Spat with Apple, Complains 
to ITC, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 29, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://arstechnica.com/apple/ 
2009/12/nokia-hurls-new-salvo-in-spat-with-apple-complains-to-itc/. 
5 Smartphone Patent Wars, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/ 
index.php?title=Smartphone_patent_wars&oldid=605528380 (last visited Feb. 
25, 2015). 
6 Id. 
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version of the Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement sheds some light 
on the current state of smartphone licensing agreements.7 One 
notable aspect of the Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement is a 
relatively novel so-called “anti-cloning” provision.8 During an 
extensive search of available public sources, very few references to 
such provisions appear to exist, with almost all of them focused on 
the Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement9 or the Apple/Microsoft 
1997 settlement agreement.10 
 
1. Apple/Samsung 
 
Presently, Apple is deeply involved in litigation with Samsung 
over a number of smartphone patents.11 According to reports and 
filings, Apple has predicated any settlement agreement upon 
Samsung’s acquiescence to an anti-cloning provision that is likely 
very similar to the one found in the Apple/HTC Settlement 
Agreement.12 A question that needs to be asked is whether Apple’s 
                                                                                                             
7 Patent License and Settlement Agreement between HTC America, Inc., 
HTC Corp., and S3 Graphics Co., Ltd.; and Apple Inc. (Nov. 11, 2012), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/115711499/apple-htc-settlement-redacted 
[hereinafter Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement]. 
8 Id. at Exhibit A “Requirements for Cloned Product” [hereinafter 
Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision]; see also Florian Mueller, HTC Agreed Not 
to ‘Clone’ Apple’s Products, but the Pinch-to-Zoom Gesture is Licensed, FOSS 
PATENTS (Dec. 6, 2012, 7:07 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/12/htc-
agreed-not-to-clone-apples-products.html (characterizing the “Requirements for 
Cloned Product” as an “anti-cloning provision”). 
9 Mueller, supra note 8. 
10 Patent Cross License Agreement Between Apple Computer, Inc. and 
Microsoft Corporation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 5, 
1997), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/584.pdf [hereinafter Apple/ 
Microsoft Agreement]; see also Matt Macari, Apple and Microsoft Cross-
License Deal Includes ‘Anti-Cloning’ Protections Going Back to 1997, THE 
VERGE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/13/3239977/apple-
and-microsoft-cross-license-agreement-includes-anti-cloning. 
11 Apple Sues Samsung for $2bn as Tech Rivals Head Back to Court, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/ 
31/apple-sues-samsung-for-2bn?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487. 
12 Florian Mueller, Apple Insists on Anti-Cloning Provision as Part of Any 
Patent Settlement with Samsung, FOSS PATENTS (Jan. 20, 2014, 4:42 PM), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/apple-insists-on-anti-cloning-
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insistence on such a provision constitutes an attempt by Apple to 
inappropriately leverage its patent monopoly power to expand the 
scope of its patent rights to cover subject matter outside of the 
statutory grant. 
 
B.  Anti-Cloning Provisions 
 
During settlement negotiations and in settlement agreements, 
each party seeks to maximize its own profit and position and is 
loath to empower its competition to easily compete directly with 
itself, especially in the fast-moving and consumer preference-
driven retail electronics market. As such, certain iconic 
corporations, namely Apple, have attempted to protect what they 
consider to be a “distinctive user experience,”13 a nebulous term 
that attempts to capture aspects of the corporation’s products and 
innovations that do not otherwise qualify for protection within the 
intellectual property regimes and protect those aspects from being 
copied by Apple’s competitors. This protection is sought through 
the use of anti-cloning provisions, which essentially forbid a 
“substantially similar” user experience to result from the use of any 
licensed patents or intellectual property. Apple, in particular, 
appears to believe that it requires this contractual protection 
because it finds the current intellectual property regimes 
inadequate in capturing and protecting what it appears to consider 
one of its most valuable assets: the look and feel of its products. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
provision.html (“In a sworn declaration of January 16, 2014, Apple’s BJ 
Watrous, Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, told the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California that Apple’s 
‘discussions with Samsung have consistently included limits to both the scope of 
any license and a prohibition against cloning Apple products.’ On that basis, 
Apple’s lawyers wrote on the same day: ‘Samsung incorrectly claims [in its 
opposition to Apple’s motion] that Apple made recent offers to Samsung 
without anti-cloning provisions. Every offer Apple made to Samsung has 
included limits to both the scope of any license and a prohibition against cloning 
Apple products.’”). 
13 See, e.g., Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision, supra note 8, at clause 1. 
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1. Conceptual Framework of the Provisions 
 
At the center of anti-cloning provisions is the idea that the user 
experience, fostered by a particular innovation or set of 
innovations, lends economic value to a product on the market. 
Generally, this premise can be accepted as true, given past studies 
on the effects of brand loyalty and marketing in general and, more 
specifically, discussions on the unique user experience and user 
loyalty exhibited by users of Apple products.14 
On this point, Apple does have a potentially valid concern if its 
goal is to protect the totality of a user’s experience from 
duplication. In brief, the main intellectual property regimes are 
patent (both utility and design), copyright, trademark, trade dress, 
and trade secret.15 Each of these protections can cover various 
aspects of an abstract operating system. Copyright will protect the 
source and object code from wholesale copying and will also cover 
the expressive elements of the operating system, such as the icons, 
system animations, system sounds, etc.16 Copyright will generally 
not, however, serve to cover any functional or architectural aspects 
of the operating system.17 Patent law will serve to protect those 
functional aspects of the operating system that are novel and 
inventive.18 Here, however, the burden is high, and many aspects 
of operating system behaviors that make up the totality of the user 
experience will not qualify for protection under the patent 
regime.19 
Trade secret is of little use to the operating system if the system 
is designed for retail use, as the “secrets” contained in the object or 
source code will be placed into the hands of consumers. With the 
proliferation of app developers (which strengthen any operating 
system’s ecosystem and make it more attractive), the need for the 
                                                                                                             
14 See, e.g., Ben Thompson, Apple and the Innovator’s Dilemma, 
STRATECHERY (Dec. 9, 2010), http://stratechery.com/2010/apple-innovators-
dilemma/. 
15 1 HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §§ 1:1, 2:1, 
3:1, 4:1 (updated Mar. 2015). 
16 Id. § 4:2, n.2. 
17 Id. § 4:18, n.7. 
18 Id. § 1:10, n.1. 
19 Id. at n.2. 
8
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/2
2015] THE ANTI-CLONE WARS: 161 
THE PER SE ILLEGALITY OF ANTI-CLONING PROVISIONS 
general public to have and understand the inner workings of the 
development platform effectively negates the trade secret regime 
absent licensing terms imposing duties of secrecy upon users and 
developers (terms that do not currently exist in either end user or 
developer license agreements).20 And trademark law will only 
prevent other operating systems from confusing the public as to 
which company’s operating system it uses.21  
Of the existing intellectual property regimes, trade dress may 
be the only one that has the potential to afford Apple the ability to 
protect its “distinctive user experience.” Trade dress refers 
generally to a clearly articulated design or combination of elements 
that is either inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness 
through secondary meaning; is not functional; and serves to 
identify a source, sponsorship, affiliation, or connection.22 In 
examining whether trade dress covers Apple’s user experience, we 
may assume that their user experience is distinctive and even 
serves to identify Apple as a source.23 The crucial question is 
                                                                                                             
20 Id. § 2:2-3; iOS Developer Program License Agreement, TOR BUG 
TRACKER & WIKI, available at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
attachment/ticket/6540/ios_program_standard_agreement_20130610.pdf; iOS 
8.1 End User License Agreement, TOR BUG TRACKER & WIKI, available at 
https://ssl.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iOS81.pdf. 
21 HOLMES, supra note 15, § 3:1, at n.5. 
22 1 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 8:1 (4th ed. 2014). 
23 The author believes the experience to be distinctive but leaves aside 
whether a customer or user’s experience with a product or service alone is 
sufficient to identify a source. In examining this issue, courts will likely be hard-
pressed to avoid conflating user experiences with the first impressions a user 
may have when comparing two products or services but should make every 
effort to do so. For example, a customer walking into two taco shops may find 
the décor to be very similar. This similarity in décor may constitute a violation 
of the Lanham Act. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
But how a product or service looks does not wholly define the user experience, 
although, admittedly, it may contribute to it. The customer may be greeted at 
one restaurant with a festive, signature welcome that all the front staff join in on 
and may be provided free tortilla chips and salsa upon seating while the other 
restaurant is more muted, albeit still polite, in its greeting and fails to provide 
chips and salsa for free. The impression an objective person may have looking at 
two photographs of the restaurants may indeed lead that observer to conclude 
that the appearances are likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the 
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whether the constituent elements of Apple’s products that provide 
this distinctive user experience are functional. If they are, then 
trade dress (and trademark) protection is not available.24 If they are 
non-functional, then it is likely that Apple may find protection 
from clones in trade dress. 
Before addressing whether or not the constituent elements that 
comprise the distinctive user experience may or may not qualify 
for protection as trade dress, it is important to note that neither 
outcome affects whether or not Apple’s inclusion of these elements 
in the anti-cloning provision of the patent licensing agreement 
constitutes patent misuse. If trade dress protection is available then 
the elements are necessarily non-functional and their inclusion 
must improperly expand the patent grant through their inclusion. 
But if, due to the elements’ functionality, trade dress protection is 
not available, then their inclusion must also improperly expand the 
patent grant by leveraging the grant to protect non-patented 
functional elements from infringement. Indeed, the functionality 
doctrine of trade dress law exists to ensure that de jure functional 
trade dress is not monopolized to ensure competitive fairness, the 
same end goal of the doctrine of patent misuse.25 In short, the legal 
                                                                                                             
restaurants’ goods or services. However, an objective person experiencing the 
two restaurants’ respective offerings will not necessarily find such confusion to 
exist. Indeed, the disparate treatment offered by each restaurant may clearly 
identify each one to the customer. On the other hand, it may also be taken as a 
particular “play” on a standard motif that, while perhaps adding to or subtracting 
from the enjoyment of the experience, does not actually serve as identification. 
In applying this type of analysis to software and/or device users, courts should 
face an additional challenge in determining what skill level consumers are 
expected to have with regard to software as it pertains to their experience using 
the software and their sophistication in being able to tell two similar products 
apart from each other. In determining whether consumer experiences, as 
opposed to first impressions, are likely to cause confusion about source, courts 
will need to dig deeper than comparing pictures in exhibits and take steps to 
compare the distinctive experiences that some litigants claim. 
24 HOLMES, supra note 15, § 3:15. 
25 Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (“Rather, de jure functionality rests on utility, which is determined in light 
of superiority of design, and rests upon the foundation [of] . . . effective 
competition.” (citing In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340 
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (internal quotations omitted)). 
10
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/2
2015] THE ANTI-CLONE WARS: 163 
THE PER SE ILLEGALITY OF ANTI-CLONING PROVISIONS 
status of the constituent elements not protected by the patent grant 
has no effect in the patent misuse analysis that follows in Part III 
Turning back to the applicability of trade dress as a suitable 
form of protection for Apple’s distinctive user experience, briefly, 
the question is whether the user experience, in whatever form it 
takes, is functional. As seen in the Apple/HTC licensing agreement 
(see infra Part I.B.2.b.), Apple’s definition of a cloned feature of 
the distinctive user experience requires the feature to literally 
infringe a licensed patent. Because utility patents are at least strong 
evidence of a feature’s functionality,26 cloned features in their 
entirety should not be covered by trade dress since they necessarily 
would contain practiced utility patents. The question then becomes 
whether the non-functional visual appearance of the cloned feature 
is eligible for trade dress protection. On this point, there is 
currently a fair bit of contention and a lack of clarity. On the one 
hand, courts have previously refused to find the look and feel of a 
computer program or the appearance of video monitors and 
keyboards to be eligible for trade dress protection.27 On the other 
hand, some courts have indicated that the look and feel of a 
website may fall within the protections that trade dress provides.28 
                                                                                                             
26 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001) 
(“A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are 
functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong 
evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the 
statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise 
by the party seeking trade dress protection. Where the expired patent claimed 
the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must 
carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance 
by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the 
device.”). 
27 Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh & Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. 598 (D.N.J. 
1985) (holding that the layout of keys and set-up screen and general appearance 
of video monitor are functional, while the shape and color of keyboard and 
monitor are nonfunctional but have acquired no secondary meaning); see 
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. 
La. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, remanded, 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 
1994) (stating that the “look and feel” of a computer program is not protectable 
trade dress). 
28 Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1248 (W.D. Wash. 
2007); see also Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. Civ. 
3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (denying 
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These courts, however, have been unable to provide a more 
thorough analysis on the subject due to settlements prior to 
reaching the merits of such claims. Thus, the issue remains 
unaddressed and ripe for more thorough consideration by the 
judiciary and academics. 
In any event, the above discussion shows the fractious nature 
of the protection provided by the various intellectual property 
regimes and the need to incorporate multiple protections into any 
intellectual property strategy. While there was vigorous debate in 
the mid-1990s regarding developing a sui generis protection for 
software29 that would be similar to the sui generis protection of 
semiconductors that had recently been enacted,30 the lack of an 
agreed-upon framework for protection and the presence of 
protection, although a patchwork, through the existing intellectual 
property regimes inhibited the adoption of such protections. Given 
the importance of building and maintaining a unique user 
experience, it makes sense from a business perspective that 
companies reliant on such distinctive features would endeavor to 
protect their user experience from being duplicated. To a great 
extent, the intellectual property regime framework provides for 
such protection through the use of utility and design patents, 
copyright, trademark, trade dress, and trade secret protections. 
Indeed, some industry leaders believe that, while difficult and 
costly to achieve, the “total user experience” can be fully protected 
within traditional intellectual property regimes through a divide-
and-conquer approach.31 
                                                                                                             
summary judgment, stating “protection of the ‘look and feel’ of a website 
remains unclear”). 
29 See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., Symposium: Toward a Third 
Intellectual Property Paradigm: A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection 
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2327 (1994) (arguing that 
computer “programs are machines that happen to have been constructed in the 
medium of text” and, as such, differ from other kinds of machines or textual 
works for purposes of intellectual property protection). 
30 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14 
(2014). 
31 Charles Mauro, Apple v. Samsung: Impact and Implications for 
Product Design, User Interface Design (UX), Software Development and 
the Future of High-Technology Consumer Products , MAURO NEW MEDIA 
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While Apple has adopted this approach to some degree, it has 
also chosen to buttress its intellectual property protection with 
contractual and licensing safeguards that essentially prohibit the 
development or production of a product that is substantially similar 
to one produced by Apple that practices any licensed patent in any 
respect. Two examples of such provisions are provided below. 
 
2. Recent Examples of these Provisions 
 
The first relevant example of this provision, the 1997 
Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement, set forth the relevant anti-
cloning language within the definitional section. Only the relevant 
definitions are presented below. The second, the Apple/HTC 
settlement agreement, set forth the relevant anti-cloning language 
in a separate Exhibit, “Requirements for Cloned Product,” which is 
presented in its entirety below. 
 
a. Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement 
 
In relevant part, the Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement 
states: 
1.6 “Licensed Products” shall mean (i) any and 
all process or activities performed by a party and 
(ii) any and all machines, articles of manufacture, 
compositions of matter and any other products 
which are designed, developed, duplicated, 
manufactured, acquired or rendered by or for a 
party and which are transferred by or made 
available from a party. Licensed Products shall 
include, without limitation, Licensed Programs, but 
shall exclude Clone Products or Foundry Products. 
                                                                                                             
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.mauronewmedia.com/blog/apple-v-samsung-
implications-for-product-design-user-interface-ux-design-software-development 
-and-the-future-of-high-technology-consumer-products/ (“IP practitioners 
should make use of all available forms of IP protection including design 
patents, utility patents, copyright, trademark and in litigation, trade 
dress, to create an interlocking set of protections that cover the look, feel 
and function of [clients’] products and services.”). 
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“Clone Product” shall mean: 
1.14.1 With the exceptions listed in this section 1.14 
below, a new product designed or acquired after the 
Effective Date (“New Product”) of one of the 
Parties that is primarily designed to be and is an 
identical or substantially identical replacement in 
functionality and/or user experience of a then-
existing Commercialized Product of the other party 
(“Prior Product”) by (i) in the case of a Program, 
providing all or substantially all of the user 
commands and/or all or substantially all of the 
programming interface(s) as the Prior Product or 
(ii) in the case of a product which is not a Program, 
providing the same or substantially the same 
physical form or appearance to the user and 
electronic and/or mechanical design as the Prior 
Product. 
1.14.12 To the extent that the Parties independently 
develop new products, without prior detailed 
knowledge of each others’ products, and such 
products were both substantially developed prior to 
the disclosure or release of either of the products, 
then neither products shall be considered to be a 
Clone Product of the other. 
1.14.3 To the extent that a New Product of a Party 
implements functionality that any party, including a 
third party, rightfully and with proper authority (i) 
licenses as an industry standard, or (ii) otherwise 
makes available for general use by the industry, the 
above functionality shall not be considered a factor 
in the determination of whether such a New Product 
is a Clone Product. 
1.14.4 To the extent that a New Product of a Party 
implements functionality that is required for the 
New Product to interoperate or be compatible with 
(but not replace) the Prior Product, the above 
functionality shall not be considered a factor in the 
14
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/2
2015] THE ANTI-CLONE WARS: 167 
THE PER SE ILLEGALITY OF ANTI-CLONING PROVISIONS 
determination of whether such New Product is a 
Clone Product. 
1.14.5 Notwithstanding anything herein to the 
contrary, the Parties agree that none of the 
Commercialized Products existing as of the 
Effective Date are Clone Products.32 
 
b. Apple/HTC settlement agreement 
 
In relevant part, the Apple/HTC settlement agreement states: 
Requirements for Cloned Product 
Each of the following requirements must be 
satisfied in order for a particular HTC Android 
Mobile Communication Device to be considered a 
“Cloned Product” for the purposes of Article 12 
Subject to any HTC defenses, APPLE demonstrates 
that one or more valid claims of its covered Patents 
(a) is literally infringed by a significant feature of 
the human interface that has a distinctive visual 
appearance of an HTC Android Mobile 
Communications Device; (b) the same patent is also 
literally practiced by a significant feature of the 
human interface of an APPLE Mobile 
Communication Device that has a distinctive visual 
appearance, and (c) that the non-functional 
distinctive visual appearance of such feature in the 
HTC Mobile Communications Device is 
substantially similar to that in the APPLE Mobile 
Communications Device, it being understood 
however that such features will also include 
functional aspects (collective, “Distinctive Apple 
User Experience”), where such substantial 
similarity demonstrates copying (but without 
requiring proof of intent). Such substantially similar 
                                                                                                             
32 Apple/Microsoft Agreement, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
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distinctive visual appearance of the feature in the 
HTC Mobile Communications Device is referred to 
herein as the “Cloned Feature”. For Example, a 
specific graphical slider animation used in a 
APPLE Mobile Communication Devices at the 
bottom of a display screen to implement a “slide to 
unlock” feature could qualify as a distinctive Apple 
User Experience, however, a different animation 
(for example a bubble slider) or an animation at 
another location (for example along the side of a 
screen) would not be considered substantially 
similar and would not constitute a Cloned Feature. 
Functionality and related methods (for example, 
“pinch to zoom” functionality) will not be 
considered a Distinctive Apple User Experience. 
 
The Distinctive Apple User Experience (a) was first 
developed and introduced by APPLE as part of an 
APPLE Mobile Communication Device prior to 
introduction of such feature or substantially similar 
feature by HTC or any Third Party; (a) APPLE has 
not granted a license to any Third Parties that 
permits use of such features in a Mobile 
Communications Device with the Android Mobile 
OS without additional payment required for the use 
of such visual appearance or with additional 
payment if HTC agrees to such additional payment 
in order to take advantage of the exclusion from 
Cloning set forth in this Section 2(b) of this Exhibit 
A. 
 
The Cloned Feature in the HTC Android Mobile 
Communications Device must have been created by 
HTC and not result from (i) any features or design 
elements provided to HTC as part of the Android 
Mobile OS or other third party component or 
software (unless specifically selected, customized or 
16
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modified by, or specifically at the requirement of or 
exclusively for, HTC to result in the Cloned 
Feature), (ii) requirements specified for the use of 
the Android Mobile OS or associate services or 
APIs by Google Inc., or any of its affiliates, or the 
Open Handset Alliance or any successor to any of 
the foregoing, (iii) requirements specified by a 
Carrier (in its role as such), (iv) requirements of 
Wireless Standards or other standards, where 
APPLE is a member and participates and has not 
withdrawn and objected to the specification, or any 
legal or regulatory requirements, (v) any features or 
design elements included in any HTC Android 
Mobile Communication Devices or Android Mobile 
OS that have been released prior to the Effective 
Date, (vi) any features or design elements included 
in any HTC Android Mobile Communication 
Devices for which APPLE does not provide an 
Initial Notice challenging the Cloned Feature within 
the time specified in Section 12.3(a) or, if APPLE 
has provided such Initial Notice, have nonetheless 
not been found to be Cloned Features pursuant to 
Section 12.3, and (vii) any features or design 
elements substantially the same or minor variants of 
those under (v) or (vi) above which are included in 
any subsequent HTC Android Mobile 
Communication Device. 
 
There is an alternative appearance to the Distinctive 
Apple User Experience reasonably available to 
HTC for the HTC Android Mobile Communication 
Device that implements and realizes the functional, 
cost, and performance advantages of the features(s) 
covered by the Covered Patent that would not be 
considered Cloned Features (such as the examples 
17
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above regarding “slide to unlock”).33 
 
3. Comparison between the Apple/Microsoft and Apple/HTC 
Settlement Agreements 
 
As a brief examination of the licenses presented above easily 
illustrates, Apple has become more exacting in the language that it 
uses to attempt to thwart the cloning of its products. Both 
agreements, however, largely attempt to force competitors to avoid 
producing any product that implements features, interfaces, 
designs, or appearances that may be considered to be identical or 
substantially similar to those of a product that Apple produces, be 
it hardware or software. In both cases, the failure to do so results in 
the product being labeled a “clone” and thereby is not subject to 
the patent license, resulting in potential patent infringement. 
 
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF MISUSE34 
 
Before inquiring as to whether the anti-cloning provisions 
contained in the previously discussed settlement agreements 
constitute misuse, it is worth examining the foundational aspects of 
the misuse doctrine. Examining misuse establishes the bases upon 
which the misuse doctrine arose and gives a sense of where bright 
lines have been drawn in the past. 
The doctrine of intellectual property misuse applied to patent 
and copyright law reaches back to just after the turn of the 20th 
century, appearing in a patent context within the Supreme Court’s 
Motion Picture Patents case.35 The doctrine of misuse evolved and 
extended into copyright law as early as 1948 in M. Whitmark & 
                                                                                                             
33 Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
34 The general survey presented is adopted in part from HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d 
ed. 2011). For a more in-depth primer on the subject, interested readers are 
encouraged to examine Hovenkamp’s excellent analysis. 
35 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 
(1917).  
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Sons v. Jensen.36 Since these extensions, the doctrine has evolved 
independently within the respective legal regimes into the present 
day, resulting in a mix of similar restraints in some respects but 
divergent rules in others. Most notably, while the doctrine of 
copyright misuse rests on inherent principles of copyright law, 
patent misuse appears to rest primarily on a foundation derived 
from principles of antitrust. 
 
A.  Patent Misuse Jurisprudence 
 
1. Motion Picture Patents to Mercoid 
 
The first instance of the doctrine of misuse in any intellectual 
property context arose in 1917 in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co. where the patentee attempted to enforce a 
notice attached to the patentee’s projector that restricted its use to 
only films that practiced another of the patentee’s patents.37 The 
patentee was found to be unable to leverage “the exclusive right 
granted” by the patent on the projector to: 
[I]n effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly 
by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in 
its operation, but which are no part of the patented 
invention, or to send its machines forth into the 
channels of trade of the country subject to 
conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be 
imposed thereafter at the discretion of such patent 
owner.38 
Even though the Court’s opinion purported to have found the 
doctrine of misuse to be “rooted in patent policy,” the holding 
contained an “obvious competitive focus,”39 paying specific 
attention to the “extension of the patent monopoly in general and 
tying in particular.”40 
                                                                                                             
36 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948). 
37 243 U.S. at 502. 
38 Id. at 516. 
39 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-5. 
40 Id. 
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The patent misuse doctrine gained strength41 through the 
Court’s decision in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.42 In 
Mercoid, the Court found misuse in Mercoid’s “attempt to control 
the market”43 on unpatented combustion switches that were of no 
commercial value outside use within Mercoid’s patented domestic 
heating system by suing Mid-Continent for contributory 
infringement that resulted from Mid-Continent’s manufacture of 
combustion switches for use in Mercoid’s system.44 
Congress, displeased with the ever-broadening scope of the 
misuse doctrine, took action in its general revision of the Patent 
Act in 1952, choosing to explicitly curtail the breadth of the 
doctrine through restrictions codified in section 271(d) of the 
Patent Act.45 This move effectively overruled the rule in Mercoid. 
The doctrine of patent misuse retreated in the wake of this reversal, 
with the limited expansion that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s 
being curtailed by the (then) newly created Federal Circuit.46 
Paired with the additional restrictions on misuse placed by 
Congress’s revision of the patent statutes by the 1988 Patent 
Misuse Reform Act,47 misuse has generally fallen out of favor with 
courts and litigants. 
 
2. Modern Misuse: Extension of the Physical or Temporal Scope 
of the Patent Grant 
 
The Federal Circuit set forth the modern understanding of 
patent misuse in Virginia Panel v. MAC Panel, where it explained 
that: 
Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to an 
                                                                                                             
41 See Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 
(1931); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); 
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1942), for examples of 
condemnation of tying arrangements and other license restrictions. 
42 320 U.S. 661 (1944). 
43 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-6. 
44 Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 668–69. 
45 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010). 
46 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-6 to 3-7. 
47 Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010) (adding 
(d)(4)–(5) to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)). 
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accusation of patent infringement, the successful 
assertion of which “requires that the alleged 
infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly 
broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the 
patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”48 
Thus, this interpretation of patent misuse requires evidence that the 
monopoly right granted by the patent has been broadened to 
acquire a scope beyond the original grant and that this broadening 
has competitive effects. The Virginia Panel court laid out a three-
tier analysis that embodied this conception of the misuse doctrine: 
when faced with a question of whether a misuse defense can 
succeed, courts must determine whether the patentee’s conduct 
constituted per se misuse; per se legal conduct never categorized as 
misuse; or conduct that, depending on its degree of anticompetitive 
effect (as analyzed under the Rule of Reason), may be considered 
to be misuse.49 
In terms of per se misuse, the Federal Circuit noted in Virginia 
Panel that some “specific practices [constitute] per se patent 
misuse, including so-called tying arrangements in which a patentee 
conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a 
separable, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee 
effectively extends the term of its patent by requiring post-
expiration royalties.”50 Some legal theorists believe the per se 
categorization of misuse is unlikely to expand beyond these two 
categories given recent Federal Circuit decisions that have been 
seen as extremely narrowing.51 Indeed, Congress has restrained the 
per se category by restricting the doctrine to only consider tying 
arrangements to constitute per se misuse where the patentee has 
                                                                                                             
48 Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (quoting Windsurfing Int’l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
49 Id. at 869 (discussing the per se patent misuse practices, exempted 
practices (see, e.g., Mercoid, 320 U.S. 661 (1944)), and conduct that is neither 
per se legal nor illegal). 
50 Id. 
51 Saami Zain, Misuse of Misuse: Princo Corp. v. International Trade 
Commission and the Federal Circuit’s Misguided Patent Misuse Jurisprudence, 
13 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 95 (Fall 2011). 
21
Holvey: The Anti-Clone Wars: Towards a Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
174 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:3 
market power in the tying market product.52  
The second categorization of a patentee’s conduct comprises 
conduct that is per se legal and cannot comprise misuse. This 
conduct arises from the statutory rights bestowed by the patent 
statute. Where the patentee restricts rights that reasonably fall 
within the bounds of the original grant, there can never be patent 
misuse.53 Examples of conduct that falls within these bounds are: 
tying arrangements in which the patentee does not have market 
power in the tying product market, enforcing patents against 
infringing conduct, and refusing to license (to anyone or someone 
in particular).54 
The final tier of the Federal Circuit’s misuse test incorporates 
antitrust law’s Rule of Reason and was laid out in Virginia Panel: 
When a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse 
is neither per se patent misuse nor specifically 
excluded from a misuse analysis by § 271(d), a 
court must determine if that practice is reasonably 
within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject 
matter within the scope of the patent claims. If so, 
the practice does not have the effect of broadening 
the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot 
constitute patent misuse. If, on the other hand, the 
practice has the effect of extending the patentee’s 
statutory rights and does so with an anti-competitive 
effect, that practice must then be analyzed in 
accordance with the ‘rule of reason.’ . . . Under the 
rule of reason, the finder of fact must decide 
whether the questioned practice imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into 
account a variety of factors, including specific in-
formation about the relevant business, its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the 
restraint’s history, nature and effect.55 
                                                                                                             
52 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2010). 
53 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
54 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010). 
55 Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Mallinckrodt, 
 
22
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/2
2015] THE ANTI-CLONE WARS: 175 
THE PER SE ILLEGALITY OF ANTI-CLONING PROVISIONS 
Under the guidance laid out in the Federal Circuit’s three tiers, the 
doctrine of patent misuse is correctly classified as being a legal 
protection against market distortion that goes beyond the 
protection intended by the patent grant itself due to an unlawful 
expansion of the grant beyond its intended scope.56 
This is not to say that the doctrine of patent misuse is 
necessarily coextensive with that of antitrust law or that it is 
constrained by antitrust law’s precepts. While it is true that a 
finding of misuse often coincides with a finding of antitrust 
violations,57 the Supreme Court has been very clear in articulating 
its belief that the doctrine of patent misuse arises independently 
from patent policy.58 Indeed, patent misuse has been utilized to 
reach conduct from which the market or consumers could not 
depend on antitrust law to protect them.59 In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc. the Federal Circuit explained: 
The concept of patent misuse arose to restrain 
practices that did not in themselves violate any law, 
but that drew anticompetitive strength from the 
patent right, and thus were deemed to be contrary to 
public policy. The policy’s purpose was to prevent a 
patentee from using the patent to obtain market 
benefit beyond that which inheres in the statutory 
patent right.60 
This explanation provides for the existence of patent misuse where 
there is an expansion of the patent grant, even when the expansion 
has no anticompetitive effects. 
Indeed, while the bifurcation of a trial into infringement and 
antitrust prongs (including misuse) in order to hopefully avoid 
                                                                                                             
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
56 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-10. 
57 See, e.g., In re ISO Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Virginia Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 
F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
58 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (holding that 
misuse is based in patent policy and does not require proof of an antitrust 
violation). 
59 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700. 
60 Id. 
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unnecessary antitrust litigation depending on the outcome of the 
patent portion of the litigation will not render the issue of patent 
misuse moot, a trial is generally required regardless of the outcome 
of the patent portion of the litigation, further underscoring the 
doctrinal separateness between antitrust and misuse.61 
Furthermore, as a defense grounded solely in equity, the misuse 
inquiry does not carry a constitutional guarantee to a jury trial, 
unlike antitrust counterclaims.62 
 
B.  Copyright Misuse Jurisprudence 
 
Copyright misuse is regarded as younger than patent misuse, 
with most older cases refusing to acknowledge the existence of 
copyright misuse63 and only a small number of district court cases 
prior to 1990 granting relief based on the misuse defense64 
(although two cases in the early 1900s may have indicated some 
elements of the judiciary’s willingness to rely on principles of 
equity, i.e., “unclean hands,” to prevent abuses of copyright 
grants65). In any event, copyright misuse truly blossomed with the 
advent of commercial software. This allowed for copyright grants 
to potentially have substantial anticompetitive effects on a market 
as a whole, a rarity in traditional copyright domains.66  
                                                                                                             
61 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-79. 
62 Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 06-491-MPT, 2009 WL 
2252556, at *1 (D. Del. July 28, 2009) (“[T]he right to trial to a jury on a claim 
for patent misuse is not automatic.”). 
63 See, e.g., Foreign Car Parts v. Auto World, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 977, 979 
(M.D. Pa. 1973) (“It is doubtful that an anti-trust violation creates a defense in a 
copyright infringement action.”). 
64 See M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn. 1948); 
Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 615–16 (D.R.I. 
1976). 
65 See Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (2d 
Cir. 1903); Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 
1915). Both findings of unclean hands resulted from misrepresentations to the 
court or copyright office regarding the copyrighted works. 
66 Cf. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 
1170 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is often more difficult to prove an antitrust violation 
when the claim rests on the questionable market power associated with a 
copyright . . . .”). 
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As opposed to its older sibling patent misuse, in which antitrust 
concerns dominate almost every inquiry, copyright misuse today is 
commonly thought of as being wholly separate from antitrust law. 
While early courts considering the defense centered their inquiries 
squarely on antitrust principles,67 more modern inquiries have 
moved away from a reliance on antitrust principles and have 
justified findings of copyright misuse by relying solely on 
copyright policy arguments.68 
Findings of copyright misuse tend to rely on rationales that are 
said to arise from copyright policy. These rationales vary, but they 
tend to fall within one of three broad categories identified by 
Hovenkamp: abuse of process and extension of right rationales, 
competition and licensing rationales, and externality rationales.69 
Rationales relying on abuse of process or an extension of the 
rights granted by copyright do not require any implication of 
antitrust concerns. These rationales rest on principles grounded in 
copyright policy. In the case of improperly broadened grants of 
copyright, the rationale rests on the principle that misuse can be 
found in attempts to expand the copyright grant beyond its 
statutory boundaries and courts should not assist in this expansion 
by enforcing the expanded grant.70 
                                                                                                             
67 See Bellsouth Advertising & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelley Information Pub., 
Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding no copyright misuse “in the 
context before us because there is no antitrust violation”), vacated, 977 F.2d 
1435 (1992); Reed–Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“Misuse of copyright in pursuit of an anticompetitive end may be a 
defense to a suit for infringement, along the lines of the patent-misuse doctrine 
in antitrust.” The court then argued that less market power is present in 
copyright than in patent, appearing to weaken the doctrine.). 
68 See Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 
516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (1998) (“[A] defendant in a 
copyright infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a 
copyright misuse defense.”); Lasercomb American, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 
970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The question is not whether the copyright is being 
used in a manner violative of antitrust law . . . but whether the copyright is being 
used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a 
copyright.”). 
69 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.4, 3-58. 
70 Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, 350 F.3d 640, 647 
(7th Cir. 2003) (“The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the 
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In perhaps the seminal copyright misuse case, Lasercomb 
America v. Reynolds, the Fourth Circuit relied on this rationale 
exclusive of any antitrust concerns.71 Even though the contract 
clauses at issue in Lasercomb may have had anticompetitive 
effects, the court did not inquire into the effect the clauses may 
have actually had on competition.72 In Lasercomb the plaintiff 
sought to enjoin the defendant’s use of unauthorized copies of the 
plaintiff’s die-making software.73 Lasercomb’s licensing 
agreement contained clauses that prohibited licensees or their 
employees from “directly or indirectly, writ[ing], develop[ing], 
produc[ing] or sell[ing] computer assisted die making software” 
during the term of the license, which was ninety-nine years, 
potentially far in excess of the term of the copyright grant itself.74 
While the court noted that “[t]here is no question that defendants 
engaged in unauthorized copying, and the purposefulness of their 
unlawful action is manifest from their deceptive practices,”75 the 
court affirmed the existence of the misuse of copyright as a valid 
defense (analogizing its existence from patent misuse as a sister 
intellectual property regime) and found that the “misuse arises 
from Lasercomb’s attempt to use its copyright in a particular 
expression, the Interact software, to control competition in an area 
outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die 
manufacture, regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an 
antitrust violation.”76 In this way, the court specifically distanced 
the copyright misuse doctrine from necessarily relying on any 
antitrust principles, a stark difference from patent misuse, as 
previously discussed (see supra Part II.A.2.). 
                                                                                                             
bounds of antitrust, besides the fact that confined to antitrust the doctrine would 
be redundant, is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain 
property protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, 
hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an 
opponent that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist 
effectively, is an abuse of process.”). 
71 911 F.2d 970 (1990). 
72 Id. at 979. 
73 Id. at 972. 
74 Id. at 973. 
75 Id. at 971. 
76 Id. at 979. 
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Comparing the expansion of the copyright grant to the abuse of 
process, findings of misuse based on deception before the courts or 
the copyright office are also clearly reliant on principles of 
copyright policy as opposed to competition concerns. In a sense, 
abuses of process are a type of extension of the copyright grant in 
that the copyright is improvidently granted to improperly cover 
subject matter that should remain free of the copyright monopoly.77 
Rationales relying on competition and licensing concerns most 
closely mirror the majority of asserted bases of patent misuse. 
Cases relying on these rationales commonly involve collusions to 
fix prices, tying arrangements, noncompetition provisions, or 
exclusive dealing provisions, among other traditionally 
anticompetitive behaviors. Similar to the antitrust foundation of 
patent misuse, copyright misuse defenses in these cases do not 
“claim . . . that the copyright owner has transgressed copyright 
policy by seeking to expand the scope or duration of the right, but 
that she has acted anticompetitively in the licensing of that right.”78 
This rationale, while seemingly strong due to its parallel with 
patent misuse, actually proves to be rather disfavored within the 
doctrine of copyright misuse. It appears, at least on the surface, to 
be one of the weaker rationales for finding the presence of misuse. 
For example, Lasercomb could easily have rested on (or at least 
gestured at) the anticompetitive effects that limiting licensees from 
developing competing software would have had in the market. 
Plainly, allowing a dominant player to prohibit any interested party 
(its licensees) from even dabbling in independent creation of a 
competing product restricts competition in a manner that the 
Department of Justice’s 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property would consider worth analyzing 
                                                                                                             
77 qad. inc. v. ALN Associates, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266–67 (N.D. Ill. 
1991) (“When a copyright holder attempts to use legal proceedings to protect an 
improper extension of a copyright, the court may refuse to enforce the copyright. 
. . . [qad’s] misuse of both the judicial process and the copyright laws . . . 
severely restrained ALN . . . [and] impos[ed] an unwarranted harm on ALN . . . . 
That copyright misuse extended qad’s copyright privilege beyond the scope of 
the grant and violated the very purpose of a copyright. . . . This Court should not 
and will not offer its aid to a copyright holder whose actions run contrary to the 
purpose of the copyright itself.”). 
78 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.4, at 3-61 to -62. 
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for competitive effect.79 The Lasercomb court, however, chose not 
to inquire about the anticompetitive effects, relying entirely on 
copyright policy, as discussed previously, to hold that copyright 
misuse had occurred. 
Similarly, the final set of rationales concerning the potential or 
known existence of troubling externalities have been applied to 
licensing policies that do not necessarily implicate antitrust issues. 
Where licenses contain contractual terms that impose burdens on 
third parties or the public without compensation, courts should 
consider whether the imposition constitutes a departure from the 
limits on copyright grants as dictated by copyright policy. Robert 
Merges considers every holding of misuse (including patent 
misuse) to be grounded in this rationale (in the abstract) in some 
respect, claiming that “[u]nder [misuse] doctrines, courts refuse to 
enforce voluntary, bilateral contracts that presumably benefit both 
parties . . . . The only workable rationale for such a prohibition 
must be that the contracts, though mutually beneficial to the 
contracting parties, harm third parties.”80 
Although this rationale seems to be broader in its applicability 
                                                                                                             
79 The U.S. Department of Justice’s guidelines for analyzing antitrust 
concerns in innovation markets: 
3.2.3 Research and development: innovation markets 
 
If a licensing arrangement may adversely affect competition to 
develop new or improved goods or processes, the Agencies 
will analyze such an impact either as a separate competitive 
effect in relevant goods or technology markets, or as a 
competitive effect in a separate innovation market. A licensing 
arrangement may have competitive effects on innovation that 
cannot be adequately addressed through the analysis of goods 
or technology markets. For example, the arrangement may 
affect the development of goods that do not yet exist. 
Alternatively, the arrangement may affect the development of 
new or improved goods or processes in geographic markets 
where there is no actual or likely potential competition in the 
relevant goods. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 6, 1995), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t323. 
80 See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial 
Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1606 n.96 (1995). 
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due to its foothold in contract law, it is no less limited than the two 
prior rationales due to the limitations of the defense of copyright 
misuse. If no copyright claim is brought before the court and the 
plaintiff chooses to rely solely on state law rights under contract 
law, then misuse, even if present, may not be considered, even 
under this rationale. Where both a contract and copyright claim are 
brought, misuse, if found, may only bar the copyright claim, 
leaving the defendant to still face the untouched contract claim.81 
 
C.  Contrasting Approaches and Restraints Within Misuse 
 
To this point, the application of the misuse doctrine has been 
discussed in both patent and copyright contexts. While the doctrine 
is very similar in many respects in its basis and grounding in both 
contexts, some differences exist between the two. Namely, while 
copyright misuse firmly declaims any suspicion of being grounded 
in antitrust law and relies almost entirely on arguments based in 
copyright policy in finding misuse, patent misuse, which ostensibly 
grounds itself in patent policy, is much more concerned with 
antitrust analysis in its inquiries. Beyond this primary difference, 
various restraints on the doctrine of misuse also differ between the 
two disciplines. 
 
1. Statutory Restraints on Patent Misuse 
 
The doctrine of misuse is only an affirmative defense. This 
structural restraint on the remedies a claim of misuse can provide 
is actually one of the primary factors in the Federal Circuit’s 
insistence that misuse exists separate from antitrust law, its logic 
being that misuse should require a lesser burden of proof because 
the remedies it can provide are more limited in nature.82 However, 
                                                                                                             
81 Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000) 
(“[T]he court need not decide whether there was copyright misuse because 
Plaintiff does not allege copyright infringement [only common law misappropri-
ation, unfair competition, and breach of contract of the license agreement].”). 
82 Hewlett–Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (“When a party seeks to collect monetary damages from a patentee 
because of alleged violations of the antitrust law, it is appropriate to require a 
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although courts and commentators have analogized the doctrine of 
misuse to the equitable defense of unclean hands, the doctrine of 
misuse is far broader, barring both equitable and legal remedies.83 
Interestingly, misuse is not always available as an affirmative 
action for declaratory judgment.84 This restraint is not exceedingly 
common, however, and most courts have allowed such motions to 
proceed.85 
Additionally, unlike antitrust concerns or unclean hands, 
misuse can be cured, restoring the enforceability of the intellectual 
property right.86 This cure, however, is not easily achieved and 
only occurs once an offending rightsholder ceases the conduct 
considered to be misuse and the effects of the offending conduct 
have been “purged” or have “fully dissipated.”87 
Findings of misuse generally cannot prevent the collection of 
damages for conduct that occurred before the misuse began.88 
                                                                                                             
higher degree of misconduct for that damage award than when a party asserts 
only a defense against an infringement claim.”). 
83 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-71. 
84 Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1199 
(C.D. Cal. 2008); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 
428 (D.N.J. 2005); Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 
F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
85 Midwest Tape, LL v. Recorded Books, LLC, No. 3:09 CV 2176, 2010 
WL 1258101, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2010) (“[B]ecause the Complaint seeks 
declaratory judgment, the plaintiff may assert copyright misuse as an affirmative 
claim.”); Linzer Prods. Corp. v. Sekar, 499 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552–53 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1079–81 (N.D. Cal. 2007); 
Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL 756558, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
86 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-72. 
87 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04; United States Gypsum 
Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957), reh’g denied, 353 U.S. 932 
(1957) (“[T]he courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to 
recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or 
thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or ‘purged’ as 
the conventional saying goes.”). 
88 Carotek, Inc. v. Kobayashi Ventures, LLC, No. 07 CIV. 11163 (NRB), 
2010 WL 1640190, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2010) (“Carotek has not pointed us 
to a single decision holding that a patent misuse defense should bar a claim for 
unpaid royalties that accrued prior to the period of alleged misuse, and we can 
discern no persuasive reason for reaching such a conclusion.”). 
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However, whether or not retroactive damages for infringing 
conduct that occurred during the period of misuse are allowed 
depends on the discipline, with patent law being unlikely to allow 
such damages to accrue89 but copyright appearing to allow them.90 
As noted before, findings of misuse, while prohibiting the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights against infringers, do 
not obviate contractual responsibilities and will be of limited use in 
defending against state law contract claims.91 However, contract 
law claims may turn out to be obviated by misuse should they 
accompany infringement actions, as a successful misuse defense 
may remove from the table any potential damages due to 
infringement. Additionally, the unenforceability of an intellectual 
property grant may render a license unconscionable (and thus 
unenforceable) since the license would (potentially) lack 
consideration on the rightsholder’s side.92 
Finally, while a finding of misuse will render the intellectual 
property grant unenforceable, where the offending conduct must 
lie in order to render a grant unenforceable has shifted over time. 
Traditionally, allegations of misuse of any one patent or a pattern 
of misuse in several patents unconnected with litigation was 
sufficient to prohibit enforcement of any patents held by a party.93 
This has apparently been constrained by the Federal Circuit in 
Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, requiring either 
the use of the patent or a connection between the offending 
conduct and the patent right.94 Similar restraints exist within 
copyright law, with most courts requiring some nexus or 
                                                                                                             
89 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-74. 
90 Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (“[T]he doctrine does not prevent 
plaintiff from ultimately recovering for acts of infringement that occur during 
the period of misuse.”). 
91 Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
92 The use of a license agreement that grants rights beyond a bare patent or 
copyright license, such as providing know-how, consulting, or other similar 
consideration, will likely allow any breach of contract claims to stand, although 
perhaps being reduced in potential damages. 
93 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6c, at 3-80 (“[A] pattern of misuse might 
bar the enforcement of any patents by the misuser.”). 
94 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
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connection between the conduct, although at least one court found 
misuse in the absence of such a connection.95 
 
D.  The Intersection of Misuse and Antitrust 
 
Throughout this discussion of the doctrine of misuse, the 
competitive effects of the doctrine have not been far removed from 
the picture, even where, as in copyright, the doctrine explicitly 
disclaims a reliance on antitrust principles.96 A primary reason for 
this is the very nature of the nation’s intellectual property regime. 
In creating the legal fiction of “intellectual property,” the 
government and legal system have necessarily prevented the 
market from truly efficient conduct, since intellectual property 
never faces scarcity in that it is a non-rivalrous good.97 Truly 
efficient and competitive market behavior would be characterized 
by the quick dissemination and widespread adoption of every 
advancement in technology not held as a trade secret as well as the 
continual publication and republication of literary and artistic 
works as the market demanded. Of course, the Founders, in their 
wisdom, devised the framework for incentivized disclosure around 
which intellectual property regimes center today. The public good 
served by the advancement of the “useful arts and sciences”98 was 
the only reason they consented to the “embarrassment of an 
                                                                                                             
95 See Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81; see also Video Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 345–46 (D.N.J. 2002) 
(requiring proof of a “nexus between . . . alleged anti-competitive actions and 
[BVHE’s] power over copyrighted material” (quoting Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. 
Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y.1979))). 
96 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see also 
Assessment Technologies v. WIREdata, 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(emphasizing the copyright policy basis of modern misuse doctrine and noting 
that “[c]ases such as Lasercomb, however, cut misuse free from antitrust”); In re 
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(describing antitrust and public policy rationales for misuse as two different 
approaches favored by different circuits). 
97 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 1.1, at 1-1. 
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
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exclusive patent.”99 As such, the very nature of the intellectual 
property regime has anticompetitive effects that the courts must 
always keep in mind. 
 
1. Anticompetitive Effects 
 
Leaving aside any analysis or critique of the intellectual 
property system as a whole that may have been implied above, 
specific attention must be paid to the perniciousness of intellectual 
property misuse on the market. Congress possesses the ability to 
simultaneously (1) recognize and structure intellectual property 
regimes to appropriately balance and account for competing 
interests when incentivizing the advancement of the useful arts and 
sciences; (2) ensure the efficient functioning of markets; and (3) 
protect the public’s interests and welfare. The misuse of granted 
intellectual property rights violently disrupts this careful balance 
by taking this ability for granted. Acts of misuse include extending 
the grant beyond the explicitly restricted framework, leveraging 
the grant to inflict harm on the markets beyond that contemplated 
by the legislature, or hiding unlawful anticompetitive conduct 
behind a veneer of legality granted by the conferred right. In this 
way misuse betrays the public’s trust and harms the very 
framework on which the alleged misuser relies for enforcement. 
Most anticompetitive conduct involving intellectual property is 
immortalized in licensing agreements. In looking at the 
anticompetitive effect a licensing agreement may exhibit, the 
central question is “whether it harms competition among entities 
that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in the 
absence of the arrangement.”100 This inquiry should examine 
various factors, such as whether the license agreements 
“anticompetitively foreclose access to competing technologies, 
prevent licensees from developing their own competing 
technologies, or facilitate market allocation or price-fixing for any 
                                                                                                             
99 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. 
100 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, supra note 79, 
at Example 1: Discussion. 
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product or service supplied by the licensees.”101 The inclusion of 
such terms should immediately signal to the reviewer that 
anticompetitive behavior may be afoot and that closer scrutiny of 
the effects of the license is required. 
Some of the primary anticompetitive conduct that courts (and 
agencies) are concerned with when dealing with intellectual 
property agreements include monopolization (anticompetitive 
conduct designed either to acquire or to maintain monopoly power 
by means other than normal competition), horizontal market 
division (anticompetitive conduct intended to limit competition by 
restricting competition between otherwise antagonistic competitors 
to prescribed markets), or other non-price restrictions (typically 
anticompetitive conduct tending to inhibit the development of 
future competition).102 
For example, a licensor prohibition on using a competitor’s 
products is clearly misuse.103 A prohibition on the development of 
competing products, which effectively denies or impedes the 
entrance of a potential competitor into the market, is analogously 
misuse.104 
Of particular interest to the discussion of anti-cloning 
provisions is the Seventh Circuit decision in Bela Seating Co. v. 
Poloron Prod.105 There, a non-price restriction prohibiting the 
manufacture of chairs other than the licensed design that were of a 
“substantially identical design” was found to be perfectly 
acceptable and not considered to be misuse. Central to this holding, 
                                                                                                             
101 Id. 
102 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 10.3. 
103 Krampe v. Ideal Indus., 347 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1972) 
(“Plaintiff’s use of the rights which he possessed in his invention to secure an 
additional right to which he was not entitled [prohibiting the licensee from 
selling competing products], combined with his maintaining the objectionable 
terms of the contract after these rights had ripened into a patent monopoly, 
constitutes misuse of his patent . . . .”). 
104 Compton v. Metal Prods., 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The public, 
in a system of free competition, is entitled to have the competition of other 
devices with a patented device and here it is against that public’s interest to use 
the patent to suppress such competition.” (quoting McCullough v. Kammerer 
Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1948)).). 
105 438 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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however, was the court’s interpretation of the license as “an 
agreement that the licensee would not make other chairs that would 
infringe on the patent in question.”106 Thus, the prohibition falls 
squarely within the scope of the granted patent right because the 
patentee is entitled to exclude all others from infringing his or her 
patent as a matter of right.107  
This holding leads to a very interesting counterpoint. If the 
restriction is legal because it remained within the bounds of the 
granted right, prohibitions on non-infringing activity, which would 
be beyond the scope of the granted right, are likely to be found to 
be unenforceable and should constitute a potential misuse of the 
grant. Indeed, were there a way to clone the chair without 
infringing the patent grant, the prohibition would be outside of the 
scope of the grant and presumptively, under this reasoning, illegal. 
 
2. Anticompetitive Settlement of IP Disputes 
 
This is not to say that every restriction attached to an 
intellectual property license is likely to constitute misuse, 
especially where the license arises within a settlement agreement. 
This is because a settlement agreement that “would otherwise 
produce an antitrust violation might be no more anticompetitive 
than the outcome of the underlying IP litigation.”108 For example, a 
suit that concludes with a finding of validity and infringement for a 
patentee may completely exclude a competitor from the market.109 
Thus, there is no decrease in competition where a settlement 
between the parties produced an identical result. However, just 
because there may be no reduction in competition does not excuse 
courts from ensuring that the settlement does not in fact violate 
antitrust principles. Given the frequent uncertainty surrounding the 
scope and validity of intellectual property rights, it is often in the 
                                                                                                             
106 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 33.6 (referencing id. at 739 (“[T]he 
restriction in the Bela agreements are limited to the manufacture of chairs 
covered by the claims of the patent in suit.”)). 
107 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010). 
108 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 7.1b. 
109 Id. 
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interest of the opposing parties to “share monopoly profits”110 
rather than pay for a roll of the die in litigation. 
Courts also favor settlement agreements because they save 
time, money, and ever-scarce judicial resources while avoiding the 
strict “dichotomy between winners and losers created by 
adjudication.”111 Legal and economic scholars largely concur with 
this opinion,112 although there has been both vigorous dissent113 
and measured criticism on this point.114 The increasing caseload of 
the federal judiciary due to the rise in federal litigation has caused 
federal judges to evolve from insulated arbiters into involved 
parties that are potentially as eager to see the case resolved as one 
or both of the other parties.115 Indeed, “[w]hile few judges wish to 
force unwilling parties to settle, many judges believe that the 
promotion of informed and fair settlements is one of the most 
important aims of pretrial management.”116 As such, when tried 
cases are the exception to the rule,117 particular attention should be 
paid to the result of settlement negotiations and the growing and 
persistent potential for settlement agreements to wreak 
anticompetitive havoc on the market. 
 
a. Hovenkamp’s framework for the analysis of settlements 
 
Given these competing interests, Hovenkamp has set out a 
                                                                                                             
110 Id. at § 7.1. 
111 Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 375, 383 (2014). 
112 Id. at 385. 
113 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1984) 
(arguing settlement brings about peace but not necessarily justice). 
114 See, for example, Laurie Kratky Dore, Public Courts Versus Private 
Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 463 (2006) (“Since the early to mid-1990s, the issue 
of secrecy in litigation has attracted nationwide attention and has generated a 
literal mountain of commentary.”) for an example of commentary directed at a 
specific aspect of settlement agreements. 
115 La Belle, supra note 111, at 411. 
116 Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New 
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 773 
(1981).  
117 La Belle, supra note 111, at 391. 
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framework for analyzing intellectual property settlement 
agreements.118 This framework is mentioned here to anticipate any 
rejoinder to the analysis of the anti-cloning provisions in Part III as 
not taking into account the provisions’ status as part of a settlement 
agreement, should they have possible pro-competitive effects. 
Under the framework, there are three types of settlements: 
settlements that raise no antitrust concerns even in the absence of 
an IP dispute, settlements that raise antitrust concerns even in the 
absence of an IP dispute, and settlements that may raise antitrust 
concerns depending on the merits of the IP dispute.119 
Generally speaking, cases that fall within the first category 
include agreements that encourage competition (i.e., reciprocal 
non-exclusive licenses). Typically, cases that fall within the second 
category include those that do not rely on determinations of patent 
or copyright policy to find injurious conduct present (i.e., 
geographical market divisions extending to products beyond the 
scope of a patent).120 The final category necessitates an 
examination of the merits of the intellectual property dispute. An 
example of this would be a case of blocking patents—a finding of 
validity for both patents results in neither party being able to 
practice the invention without a license, so any license will 
increase competition. A finding of invalidity for one or both of the 
patents, however, would render anticompetitive any license that 
restricts a party from competition.121 
While the third prong’s framework is novel and certainly worth 
the reader’s attention, its consideration must be left for later 
examination; presentation of this framework is not with the 
intention to examine whether anti-cloning provisions constitute 
antitrust violations (although this subject is certainly worth further 
inquiry), but rather to point out that even where settlement may 
have competition-enhancing aspects, anticompetitive behaviors in 
settlements may still be sufficient to call the agreement into 
question, even in a situation where limited monopolies have been 
given legal force by intellectual property grants. 
                                                                                                             
118 HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 7. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL 
 
Below are presented arguments in favor of considering anti-
cloning provisions per se misuse of copyrights and patents, or in 
the alternative, at least subject to the examination of potential 
anticompetitive results. For the purposes of this argument, only the 
anti-cloning provisions within patent cross-licensing agreements 
will be considered (since those are the most common), although 
the argument extends to copyright misuse for reasons previously 
discussed (e.g., the misuse of copyrights is subject to fewer 
statutory limitations, less reliance on antitrust principles, and has a 
harsher view of the expansion of the copyright grant). 
 
A.  Anti-Cloning Provisions Unlawfully Extend the Patent Grant 
 
As defined by the patent statute, a utility patent is granted to 
those who invent or discover “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof,”122 and a design patent is granted to 
those who invent “any new, original and ornamental design for an 
article of manufacture.”123 A granted patent entitles the inventor to 
the right to exclude others from “mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to 
sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention, within the United States or 
import[ing] into the United States any patented invention during 
the term of the patent.”124 The scope of the patent grant, then, 
necessarily resides within these statutorily prescribed boundaries to 
include only the defined elements of patentable subject matter and 
the right to exclude others from conduct. 
As seen in the anti-cloning provisions set forth in Part I, 
licensors have attempted to grant patent rights to licensees while 
restricting the practice of these licensed patents to include elements 
or conduct not specifically included within the statutory grant. As 
an example, the Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision attempts to 
prohibit HTC from developing or producing a product that is 
                                                                                                             
122 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013). 
123 Id. § 171. 
124 Id. § 271. 
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substantially similar to one produced by Apple that practices any 
licensed patent in any respect. 
Specifically, Apple has attempted to prohibit HTC from 
developing products where a “non-functional distinctive visual 
appearance of [a] feature in the HTC Mobile Communications 
Device is substantially similar to that in the APPLE Mobile 
Communications Device, it being understood however that such 
features will also include functional aspects (collective, 
‘Distinctive Apple User Experience’).”125 To do so necessarily 
implicates prohibiting HTC from utilizing otherwise unprotected 
(and perhaps unprotectable) elements in its development and 
production cycle if HTC desires to use any of the licensed patents 
within its products. This prohibition expands the scope of the 
patent grant to wildly inappropriate lengths.  
For example, consider the “slide to unlock” bar at the bottom 
of the screen as a feature that could be considered to be a part of 
the Distinctive Apple User Experience. The patent claiming the 
“slide to unlock” bar only claims “displaying an unlock image at a 
first predefined location on the touch-sensitive display while the 
device is in a user-interface lock state.”126 The patent’s figure 4A 
actually places the bar in the middle of the screen, with figure 7A 
placing it at the bottom of the screen.127 In licensing the patent, 
given that Apple has already developed and deployed a “slide to 
unlock” feature with the bar at the bottom of the screen, should 
HTC practice the patent in a feature that looks similar to Apple’s 
and is placed in a similar location (indeed in a location disclosed 
by the very patent itself), Apple could accuse HTC of cloning the 
feature and revoke the license to practice the patent in that instance 
under the terms of the HTC/Apple anti-cloning provision.128 
Some may argue that anti-cloning provisions are merely field-
of-use limitations and thus subject to, if anything, rule of reason 
analysis under antitrust laws.129 This argument is misguided. 
                                                                                                             
125 Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision, supra note 8. 
126 U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 col. 20 l. 19–21 (filed Jun. 2, 2009). 
127 Id. 
128 Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision, supra note 8. 
129 B. Braun Med., Inc. v Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“[F]ield of use restrictions . . . are generally upheld, see General Talking 
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Supposing the provision is a field of use limitation, the provision 
allows the licensee to practice the licensed patent(s) in any manner 
except in conjunction with certain non-patentable subject matter. 
This phrasing exposes the limitation for what it is: leveraging a 
patent grant to “restrain competition in an unpatented product”130 
(here, the appearance and functional aspects of the Apple 
products). 
Apple, in possession of patents that enjoy market power due to 
consumer preferences, refuses to license these patents without 
ensuring contractual protection of intellectual property that 
ostensibly falls outside of the current regime. In doing so, the 
settlement agreement attempts to extend the patent grant to cover 
this intellectual property. This occurs due to how the license is set 
up. Should HTC produce a product that practices one of Apple’s 
licensed patents without “infringing” on the Distinctive Apple User 
Experience, the product is licensed and HTC does not infringe on 
Apple’s patents. Should HTC produce a product that practices one 
of Apple’s licensed patents while “infringing” on the Distinctive 
Apple User Experience, the product is not licensed and HTC does 
infringe on Apple’s patents. As such, but for the infringement of 
the Distinctive Apple User Experience, HTC would not incur 
liability for patent infringement, extending the scope of the patent 
grant to cover the unpatentable subject matter. 
Some may question whether forbidding licenses that prohibit 
the wholesale cloning of features in competing product lines is a 
positive endeavor. Is it not good for innovation to allow parties to 
settle a case in a manner in which the patent infringer obtains a 
license to use the patent in some fields of use but not others? Why 
should a patent holder have to license patents for use in directly 
competitive products when the infringer can use the patent in other 
products?  
                                                                                                             
Pictures, 305 U.S. at 127 . . . , and any anticompetitive effects they may cause 
are reviewed in accordance with the rule of reason. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 
at 708, 24 USPQ2d at 1179–80.”). 
130 Id. (“Two common examples of such impermissible broadening are 
using a patent which enjoys market power in the relevant market . . . to restrain 
competition in an unpatented product or employing the patent beyond its 17-
year term.”). 
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First, as discussed previously, the anti-cloning provisions are 
not mere field of use restrictions. If Apple wanted to restrict HTC 
or Microsoft from deploying “slide to unlock” in mobile devices, 
Apple is certainly free to attempt to license the “slide to unlock” 
patent with that restriction in place. Apple is not likely to get much 
interest in that license, however, because the patent’s true value 
rests in the ease with which it integrates user actions with 
unlocking mobile devices, be they phones or tablets. Anti-cloning 
provisions, as opposed to the exemplar field of use restrictions 
above, restrict the practice of the patents not in certain fields but 
rather in combination with other non-patentable subject matter. It 
is this defining characteristic that removes the anti-cloning 
provisions from being simple field-of-use restrictions and places 
them squarely within the domain of patent misuse. 
Second, Apple is under no obligation to license its patents to 
anyone.131 Apple is also under no obligation to license its patents 
to competitors without limiting the license to exclude the fields of 
competition (such as the example in the previous paragraph). 
However, should Apple choose to license its patents to competitors 
without such a field limitation, Apple may not restrict the usage of 
the licensed patents within that field to hinder competition by 
requiring that the patents not be practiced in conjunction with non-
patentable subject matter, as it does with anti-cloning provisions. 
The possible procompetitive benefits that may be alleged are 
inconsequential. In both instances, the anti-cloning provisions 
serve to impermissibly restrict competition by improperly 
expanding the patent grant via licensure to capture unpatentable 
subject matter that rests squarely outside of the exclusive rights 
provided by the patent grant. Ignoring this fact in favor of any 
potential procompetitive argument only serves to undermine the 
patent system as a whole and intellectual property as a general 
concept. 
                                                                                                             
131 Cygnus Therapeutic Systems v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (“[The patentee] was under no obligation to license [its patented 
product]. The patent statute grants a patentee the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. §§  154, 271(a) 
(1994). Indeed, a patentee may, if it wishes, do nothing with the subject matter 
of the patent. See King Instrument Corp. v. Perego . . . .”). 
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1. This Extension is Broader and More Flagrant than Term 
Expansions 
 
While anti-cloning provisions should be considered to 
constitute misuse simply due to the extension of the patent grant to 
cover unpatentable subject matter, this extension of the patent 
grant is actually broader and more flagrant than other term 
expansions in that it entirely removes unpatentable innovation 
from being brought to the market by others. This is especially true 
if we accept Apple’s allegations that its success in the market is 
due, in large part, to its user experience.132 In granting patents, the 
market is always deprived of some elements of an innovation for a 
period of time. An extension of this deprivation (i.e., patent term 
extension), while harmful, has a limited effect because the vacuum 
was created in order to incentivize the innovation in the first place. 
Expansions of the scope or coverage of the patent grant have much 
more pernicious effects on the marketplace. Through these 
provisions, Apple can potentially exclude all licensees from 
utilizing non-patentable subject matter in their products or 
innovations as long as Apple is able to continue to secure patents 
with its market power that are sufficient to leverage acquiescence 
to its anti-cloning provisions. Consumers are denied fair 
competition regarding this subject matter so long as Apple’s 
competitors must agree to not engage in competition. This vacuum 
was not created in order to incentivize innovation. Rather, the 
vacuum is forcibly imposed on the market by an actor that 
possesses market power. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
132 Complaint at 1, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al, 5:12-
cv-00630 (N.D. Cal. Feb 08, 2012) (“Apple’s iconic mobile devices . . . are now 
among the most distinctive and successful products in the world. The 
revolutionary patented design and user experience of these products are the 
result of Apple’s massive investment in innovation and have contributed to the 
extraordinary acclaim and success of Apple’s products.”). 
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B.  Anti-Cloning Provisions are Anticompetitive 
 
By prohibiting Apple’s competitors from utilizing elements 
and subject matter that would otherwise be available to them (due 
to being unprotected by the patent grant), the anti-cloning 
provisions restrain effective competition on the merits. This 
necessarily reduces competition in that it prevents the use of any of 
the licensed patents in a context that the market has approved of 
and adapted to by any competitors. For example, the Apple/HTC 
licensing agreement specifically identifies the “slide to unlock” bar 
at the bottom of the screen as a feature that could be considered to 
be a part of the Distinctive Apple User Experience.133 Assuming 
for the moment that there are other ways that the “slide to unlock” 
feature could be implemented, such as along the side of the phone, 
the inertial position of the market impacts the demand. Apple, as a 
prime mover in the smartphone market, is in a position to guide 
user preferences by simply implementing features and making the 
market accustomed to certain aspects of those features. If effective 
competition requires a user experience or appearance that is similar 
to products on the market or an experience or appearance that 
possesses a similar veneer of non-patentable subject matter, any 
restraint on using the non-patentable subject matter clearly hinders 
that competition. 
While the America Invents Act removes the best mode defense 
from alleged infringers’ available defenses, the requirement that 
the best mode be included within the specification of an 
application remains.134 The patent is granted to the patentee in 
exchange for disclosing the patentee’s invention to the public. This 
disclosure is intended to enable the public to practice the invention 
once the patent has expired and to release the invention into the 
public domain. Should a licensor require that the best mode of an 
invention (or perhaps the only mode of an invention) not be 
practiced by the licensee, the licensee’s ability to provide robust 
                                                                                                             
133 Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement, supra note 7. 
134 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2013) 
(“[A]ny requirement of section 112, except that the failure to disclose the best 
mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or 
held invalid or otherwise unenforceable.”). 
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competition is effectively gutted. Here, through anti-cloning 
provisions, Apple potentially licenses its patents on the condition 
that the best mode (as embodied within the Distinctive Apple User 
Experience) of the disclosed invention not be practiced or else the 
resulting product be considered to be unlicensed and infringing. As 
such, the anti-cloning restrictions should always be considered to 
be anticompetitive. 
 
C.  Anti-Cloning Provisions are More Pernicious than Reverse 
Engineering Clauses 
 
It may be argued at this point that these anti-cloning provisions 
are akin to restrictions on reverse engineering and that there are 
facial similarities between them; thus, since restrictions on reverse 
engineering are permitted, so too should anti-cloning provisions be 
allowed. A brief introduction to reverse engineering prohibitions 
followed by an analysis of the key differences between reverse 
engineering prohibitions and anti-cloning provisions will address 
this argument. 
 
1. Reverse Engineering is a Matter of Copyright Law that May Be 
Restrained by Contract 
 
In Bowers v. Baystate,135 the Federal Circuit held that parties 
are free to enter into agreements that enforce stricter requirements 
than copyright law protections allow and that such agreements are 
not preempted by copyright law. This notion relies heavily on 
ProCD v. Zeidenberg,136 where the court determined that 
uncopyrightable materials could be protected by shrinkwrap 
licenses because no new exclusive rights were created for the 
copyright holder. Furthermore, the court in Bowers noted that Data 
General v. Grumman137 demonstrated that state laws dealing with 
similar subject matter as federal copyright laws (the unlawful 
copying of trade secret materials and unlawful copying, 
                                                                                                             
135 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
136 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
137 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 
1994). 
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respectively) are not necessarily preempted so long as the state law 
is not wholly encompassed by copyright law.138 
Judge Dyk’s vigorous dissent in Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies, Inc.139 and the extensive commentary against the 
majority’s holding140 center around the harm to necessary 
limitations on the copyright grant, such as fair use reverse 
engineering, that is done by allowing shrinkwrapped contracts, 
which are commonly compared to contracts of adhesion, to 
effectuate the removal of such limitations. While Judge Dyk freely 
admits that the contracting away of a fair use defense or 
agreements to not engage in all permissible uses of copyrightable 
material that an unconstrained licensor may be entitled to is both 
possible and legal, he requires that the agreement be “freely 
negotiated” and thus add an “extra element” to the contract law 
claim that allows it to avoid preemption under Data General.141 
While convincing to many academics and commentators, the 
dissent has not been adopted and the majority opinion has been 
consistently followed.142 However, the perniciousness of 
restrictions on reverse engineering, even where the restrictions are 
unbargained for, is limited solely to the expression of the 
underlying structure of a program and does not prohibit the 
development of apparent behaviors that require no decompilation 
to discover. In that sense, a restriction on reverse engineering, 
while potentially harmful to copyright policy (especially with 
                                                                                                             
138 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324. 
139 Id. at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
140 See, e.g., David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After 
Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 644 (2004); 
Christopher M. Kaiser, Comment, Take it or Leave it: Monsanto v. McFarling, 
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, and the Federal Circuit’s Formalistic 
Approach to Contracts of Adhesion, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487 (2005); Jonathan 
Wilson, Case Note, Can a Copyright Holder Prevent Reverse Engineering? The 
Federal Circuit Court Holds that the Federal Copyright Act Does Not Preempt 
“No Reverse Engineering” Clauses, 8 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 467 
(2004). 
141 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336–37. 
142 See, e.g., Neon Enter. Software, LLC v. IBM Corp., No. A-09-CA-896 
AWA, 2011 WL 2036674 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (dealing with “reverse assembly”); 
cf. Hotsamba, Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4882, Copy. L. 
Rep. (CCH) P28, 788 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2004). 
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regard to interoperability), does not encompass the whole of the 
uncopyrightable elements of a work. Indeed, copyright law 
explicitly does not cover the behavioral aspects of software; 
therefore, if a developer is able to determine the underlying 
workings of a particular piece of software from a facial 
examination or is able to reproduce the behaviors in a different 
manner, the rightsholder has no recourse, as the substantially 
similar end product (behavior) is not the object of protection. 
 
2. Differentiation between Anti-Reverse Engineering and Anti-
Cloning Restrictions 
 
Contractual restrictions on reverse engineering and contractual 
restrictions on cloning activities are fundamentally different for a 
single reason. While reverse engineering restrictions serve to 
prohibit an activity that involves a work that is within the scope of 
the copyright grant (and even this prohibition is incomplete, as 
noted above), anti-cloning restrictions necessarily implicate and 
cover more than can be contained within a patent grant and 
potentially any intellectual property grant.  
For example, where software source code has been compiled 
into machine-readable object code for distribution, the 
decompilation of the object code (and thus its unauthorized 
copying), in order to reverse engineer attributes, behaviors, and 
concepts underlying the expressive elements of the source code, is 
allowed by the courts as a fair use of the copyright grant.143 By 
requiring a finding of fair use to be legal, the practice necessarily 
involves work that is covered by the grant. A prohibition on 
reverse engineering merely prevents the licensee from examining 
the specific implementations that the licensor has utilized to 
achieve the various attributes and behaviors present in the 
software. The prohibition alone does not forbid making use of 
                                                                                                             
143 See Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 
1993); Sony Computer Equipment v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that the disassembly of computer code may be a fair use of a 
copyrighted work if disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and 
functional elements embodied in the work and there is a legitimate reason for 
seeking such access). 
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independently derived implementations of the various attributes or 
behaviors or forbid the development of similar attributes or 
behaviors for deployment in similar products.144 
This may be contrasted with anti-cloning provisions. These 
provisions have a far and deep reach, attempting and claiming to 
cover every aspect of a “user experience,” reserving such an 
experience to one party or another. This necessarily encompasses 
far more than can ever be reached by the traditional regimes of 
intellectual property. Indeed, a clear and dangerous reality of anti-
cloning provisions is the extent to which no one actually knows 
how far they truly reach.145 Where expressive portions of a piece of 
                                                                                                             
144 i-Systems, Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. CIV. 02-1951 JRTFLN, 2004 WL 
742082 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2004) (“[Any elements of the program] may be 
unprotectable because they constitute idea rather than expression, are facts or 
processes, are unoriginal or in the public domain, or are subject to the doctrines 
of merger or scenes a faire.” (citing Control Data, Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F. 
Supp. 1316, 1323 (D. Minn. 1995)).); see also id. at 33 (“The main purpose of a 
program is almost always an idea, and thus unprotectable.” (citing Gates Rubber 
Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993)).). 
145 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160337, 40-
41 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) (“The scope of the Apple patents and HTC products 
covered by the HTC Agreement is not entirely clear. This much appears 
undisputed: the agreement settled litigations between Apple and HTC that 
involved 32 of Apple’s U.S. patents, including the ‘381 and ‘915 patents, see 
Updated Rebuttal Expert Report of Michael J. Wagner for New Trial on 
Damages, August 26, 2013, 353 (‘Wagner Updated Rebuttal Report’), and the 
agreement explicitly does not cover Apple’s design patents, see Article 5.1. But 
the parties’ experts do not necessarily agree on whether the agreement also 
exempts the ‘381, ‘915, or ‘163 patents, as applied to HTC’s smartphones. 
Compare Wagner Updated Rebuttal Report 344 (‘[T]he [HTC Agreement] 
explicitly provided a license to [the ‘381 and ‘915] patents, in addition to an 
implicit license to the ‘163 Patent.’) with Videotaped Deposition of Julie Davis, 
August 26, 2013, at 227 (ECF No. 2573-5) (‘I don’t know if [those patents] are 
[included] or are not.’). The reason for the lack of clarity appears to be due to 
the agreement’s ‘anti-cloning’ provision. In overly simplistic terms, but 
sufficient for current purposes, the anti-cloning provision exempts from HTC’s 
license any product for which HTC copied the patented design and related 
functionality of an Apple product, regardless of whether HTC intended to copy 
that product. See HTC Agreement, Articles 5.1 & 12, Exhibit A. Although the 
anti-cloning provision expressly does not exempt pure functionality, such as 
‘pinch to zoom,’ from HTC’s license, id., Exhibit A, Apple does not concede 
that the HTC Agreement gives HTC a license to the utility patents at issue in the 
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software contain non-expressive attributes or behaviors or 
functional elements, those elements are considered to be beyond 
the scope of a copyright grant. Where functional elements qualify 
for patent protection, the environment in which they are utilized 
does not factor into whether a patent grant covers the element. 
Furthermore, a claim over the user experience for software will 
almost certainly rely in some measure on patentable subject matter 
whose protection has expired and has entered into the public 
domain. Perhaps a software author could argue for a thin copyright 
covering the selection and arrangement of various protectable and 
non-protectable elements, but choosing not to attempt protection in 
this manner and instead relying on provisions prohibiting cloning 
clearly expands the scope of whatever intellectual property rights 
have been granted and exposes the public to the potential recapture 
of intellectual property in the public domain.  
Indeed, compared to the prohibition on “examination” to which 
was analogized reverse engineering above, anti-cloning provisions 
prohibit far more. They prohibit the very use of disclosed 
implementations (i.e., the implementations disclosed, as intended 
by the patent regime, in the patent application or, potentially, in the 
public domain) in developing or producing similar attributes or 
behaviors not covered by the patent grant for deployment in 
competing products, attributes or behaviors that may be included in 
the very disclosure that the licensor ostensibly grants permission to 
the licensee to use. The prohibition covers a much larger expanse 
than the prohibition of reverse engineering, prohibiting the ability 
of a competitor to fairly compete in a very meaningful way, as 
opposed to restricting the in-depth examination of a licensor’s 
product. As such, restrictions on cloning activities necessarily 
implicate works and elements that fall outside of any specific 
grants of intellectual property rights, potentially including elements 
that may never be subject to the traditional intellectual property 
regimes, while restrictions on reverse engineering only affect 
activities that necessarily implicate and are covered by the 
copyright grant. 
                                                                                                             
retrial, see, e.g., 10/27/2013 Hearing Tr. at 134 (‘How you would apply that 
license to this IP is very complicated. It carves out portions of the IP that have 
been found to be infringed here.’).”). 
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The judiciary’s acceptance of contractual restraints on reverse 
engineering has likely been eased by Judge Rader’s assignment of 
de minimus damages to breaching the contractual restraint for the 
discernment of non-protected code.146 Acceptance is much less 
likely to occur, however, where contractual restraints result in wide 
swaths of innovation being removed and potential competitors 
being prohibited from entering the market without incurring heavy 
damages as a result of patent infringement. 
 
D.  Anti-Cloning Provisions Should be Found to be Per Se Illegal 
and Should Result in Equitable Remedies 
 
Under the doctrine of patent misuse, conduct may be classified 
as per se misuse, per se legal, or potential misuse depending on the 
competitive effects. Anti-cloning provisions should be considered 
to impermissibly broaden the patent grant to cover non-patentable 
subject matter and effectively restrain competition in unpatented 
products. Without even needing to consider the anticompetitive 
effects that the provisions have on the market, this improper 
broadening of the patent grant should provide enough of a basis for 
courts to find such provisions to be per se misuse—the obvious 
anticompetitive effects serving to buttress this determination. 
Arguments in favor of the anti-cloning provisions on the 
grounds that they may provide some procompetitive benefits can 
be easily brushed aside. Whatever the procompetitive benefits are 
alleged to be, the anticompetitive effect of allowing an entity with 
market power that is able to set the de facto standard in at least 
some markets in which it competes (i.e., smartphones) to 
effectively remove the possibility of directly competing products 
(i.e., Samsung smartphones) by leveraging its patent monopoly 
cannot be overcome. Even if this effect could be overcome, the 
argument is moot due to the grounding of patent misuse in patent 
policy rather than antitrust policy. Patent policy abhors 
impermissible expansions of the patent grant, and anti-cloning 
provisions are examples of such expansions. 
A finding of misuse renders the misused intellectual property 
                                                                                                             
146 Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326. 
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unenforceable. Where courts encounter such provisions, especially 
where there is a history of their usage and thus a history of misuse, 
courts should order all intellectual property rights involved in any 
licensing agreement that contains such a provision to be 
unenforceable until the misuse is cured. While other factors will 
play into a court’s determination of whether the misuse has been 
cured, at a minimum a court should require a party that has 
engaged in such misuse to renegotiate all “tainted” licensing 
agreements to remove the offending terms and certify to the court 
that no agreements currently in force contain the offending terms 
in order to demonstrate that they have cured the misuse. 
Here, Apple’s use of anti-cloning provisions should constitute 
misuse. The presence of the Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement 
and the Apple/HTC settlement agreement, paired with Apple’s 
insistence that any settlement agreement with Samsung include an 
anti-cloning provision, should provide ample evidence of a pattern 
of misuse spanning over 15 years. As such, should a court consider 
a defense of patent misuse against an infringement claim by Apple, 
the court should find Apple’s conduct to have constituted per se 
misuse and hold every patent involved in an agreement that 
contained or contains any anti-cloning provision to be 
unenforceable. At a minimum, the court should require that, in 
order for Apple to cure the misuse for any single patent, every 
agreement that the patent is involved in must have the offending 
provision removed. The anti-cloning provision itself is not 
necessarily unenforceable. Rather, the misuse renders the patent 
grant itself unenforceable. As such, the severability clause of 
Apple’s agreements may147 or may not148 remove the anti-cloning 
                                                                                                             
147 Severability clause of Apple’s agreement in the Apple/HTC settlement 
agreement: 
Severability. If any portion of this Agreement is found to be 
invalid, illegal, or unenforceable for any reason, the remainder 
of the Agreement shall continue in full force and, if needed, 
the Parties or an appropriate arbitral body shall substitute 
suitable provisions having like economic effect and intent. 
Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at 13.5. 
148 Severability clause of Apple’s agreement in the Apple/Microsoft 
settlement agreement: 
Severability. If any term, provision, covenant, or restriction of 
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provision automatically, thus potentially requiring Apple to 
renegotiate every agreement affecting every patent rendered 
unenforceable by its misuse. 
This is obviously a sweeping result with the potential to 
effectively render most or all of an entity’s intellectual property 
unenforceable for a significant amount of time (the time required 
to renegotiate all of the offending agreements where the provision 
is not automatically severed plus, potentially, time for any 
lingering “taint” to disperse). While such a remedy is anything but 
subtle, the noxiousness of the anti-cloning provisions is such that it 
demands a strong reinvigoration of the equitable remedies 
available to the judiciary in policing the appropriate bounds of 
patent licensing. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Anti-cloning provisions inflict an evil on the market, capturing 
non-patentable subject matter within the scope of a patent grant 
and exposing those who infringe upon the non-patentable subject 
matter to potential liability. This improper broadening of the patent 
grant constrains competition in unpatented products, harms 
competition, and should be considered by the courts to constitute 
per se patent misuse. Where this misuse exists, all intellectual 
property that is tainted by the anti-cloning provision should be held 
to be unenforceable while agreements that contain the offending 
provision are still in force. 
  
                                                                                                             
this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to 
be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remainder of the terms, 
provisions, covenants, and restrictions of this Agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected, 
impaired, or invalidated. 
Apple/Microsoft Agreement, supra note 10, at 14.7. 
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